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Abstract
Garbling schemes, also known as decomposable randomized encodings (DRE), have found many
applications in cryptography. However, despite a large body of work on constructing such schemes,
very little is known about their limitations.
We initiate a systematic study of the DRE complexity of Boolean functions, obtaining the
following main results:
Near-quadratic lower bounds. We use a classical lower bound technique of Nečiporuk
[Dokl. Akad. Nauk SSSR ’66] to show an Ω(n2/ logn) lower bound on the size of any DRE for
many explicit Boolean functions. For some natural functions, we obtain a corresponding upper
bound, thus settling their DRE complexity up to polylogarithmic factors. Prior to our work, no
superlinear lower bounds were known, even for non-explicit functions.
Garbling-friendly PRFs. We show that any exponentially secure PRF has Ω(n2/ logn) DRE
size, and present a plausible candidate for a “garbling-optimal” PRF that nearly meets this
bound. This candidate establishes a barrier for super-quadratic DRE lower bounds via natural
proof techniques. In contrast, we show a candidate for a weak PRF with near-exponential
security and linear DRE size.
Our results establish several qualitative separations, including near-quadratic separations between
computational and information-theoretic DRE size of Boolean functions, and between DRE size of
weak vs. strong PRFs.
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1 Introduction
Originating from Yao’s garbled circuit construction [65], garbling schemes have played an
important role in different sub-areas of cryptography. A garbled representation of f(x) is a
randomized function fˆ(x; r) such that: (1) a sample from the output of fˆ(x; r) reveals f(x)
and no additional information about x; and (2) each output bit of fˆ depends on at most
one bit of x (but can depend arbitrarily on r); equivalently, each bit of x acts as a selector
between two strings that are determined by r. We refer to such a garbled representation fˆ
for f as a decomposable randomized encoding (DRE)1 of f , and refer to the output length of
fˆ as its size.
Garbling schemes were initially motivated by the goal of efficient secure computation [65,
44, 30, 40]. This still serves as a primary motivation for their study, which has led to many
optimized constructions (see, e.g., [12] and references therein).
Over the years, different flavors of garbling schemes have found applications in many
other areas of cryptography, including parallel cryptography [8], one-time programs and
leakage-resilient cryptography [36], verifiable computation [33, 10], key-dependent message
security [13, 5], identity-based encryption [29], and more. See [18, 39, 6] for surveys.
Despite the large body of work on constructing and applying such garbling schemes, very
little is known about their limitations. Previous relevant works show very limited lower
bounds for more liberal notions of garbling. These include either conditional lower bounds
that apply to computationally efficient garbling of intractable functions [5, 1] or linear size
lower bounds for so-called “2-party PSM protocols” [30, 25, 7].
In this work, we initiate a complexity theoretic study of standard (“DRE-style”) garbling
schemes, providing lower bounds in both information-theoretic and computational settings.
1 This notion of garbling roughly corresponds to a projective garbling scheme in the terminology of Bellare
et al. [18]. We use the DRE terminology when we want to emphasize that we are not interested in the
process of “garbling” a given representation of f , but only in the existence of a garbled representation fˆ
with a given complexity.
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1.1 Our Contribution
We make two types of contributions: (1) obtaining the first super-linear lower bounds on the
DRE size of Boolean functions (with some matching upper bounds), and (2) studying the
minimal DRE size of (strong and weak) pseudorandom functions. We now detail both types
of results.
1.1.1 Near-quadratic lower bounds and matching upper bounds
We adapt a classical lower bound technique of Nečiporuk [49] to show an Ω(n2/ logn) lower
bound on the size of any DRE for many explicit Boolean functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}.
Nečiporuk showed that functions with many subfunctions cannot have small formulas or
branching programs. We provide matching lower bounds on DRE for the same class. In
particular, this yields Ω(n2/logn) lower bounds on DRE size for almost all functions, including
the explicit examples of Element Distinctness, Indirect Storage Access, Clique, Determinant,
Matching, and others. These bounds hold in both the information theoretic setting and the
exponentially-secure computational setting, provided the DRE admits a sub-exponential
decoding algorithm in the latter case.
For the explicit example of Element Distinctness, we obtain a corresponding upper bound,
thus settling its DRE complexity up to polylogarithmic factors. Furthermore, since some
of the functions that admit nearly quadratic lower bounds on DRE size can be computed
by linear-size circuits, our lower bounds establish a near-quadratic gap between the size of
computationally secure and information-theoretic DRE in a setting where the input size
is polynomially bigger than the computational security parameter. In fact, given that our
nearly quadratic lower bounds also apply to computational DREs with security parameter
nearly that of the input size, this means, in a concrete sense, that a tradeoff between DRE
size and security parameter is inherent!
The only previous lower bounds we are aware of are linear lower bounds that also apply
to the more liberal 2-party Private Simultaneous Messages (PSM)2 setting [30, 25, 7] and
quadratic lower bounds for non-Boolean functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n that follow from
the input locality lower bounds of [9]. In contrast to the other classes lower bounded by
Nečiporuk’s method, such as formulas and branching programs, no superlinear lower bounds
on DRE size were known prior to our work, even for a non-explicit (e.g., random or worst-case)
Boolean function.
1.1.2 Garbling-friendly PRFs
There is a recent line of work on “MPC-friendly” block ciphers [3, 37, 54, 28, 27, 2] and
pseudorandom functions (PRFs) [48, 32, 37, 19]. In this context, DRE size is a highly relevant
complexity measure that is often used as a benchmark. The question of minimizing the
DRE size of PRFs is motivated by the goal of securely evaluating a PRF in a setting where
the input (and possibly also the key) is secret-shared between two or more parties. This is
useful for natural applications that involve secure keyword search and distributed forms of
searchable symmetric encryption; see [19] for discussion.
2 A DRE can be viewed as an n-party PSM protocol in which each party holds just one bit. Any 2-party
PSM lower bound implies a similar DRE lower bound, but the converse is not true.
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For the case of exponentially secure (strong) PRFs, we show that the DRE size must
be Ω(n2/ logn).3 Finally, we conjecture that a candidate PRF based on the “hidden shift
problem” is exponentially secure PRF with almost matching DRE size O(n2). That is, the
function outputs the quadratic character of a hidden shift of the input, determined by the
secret key. To defeat known attacks (both quantum and classical), we restrict inputs bounded
interval rather than the entire domain. A similar PRF (without the input restriction) has
been proposed in [37] as an attractive candidate for MPC-friendly PRF, but in an interactive
setting of arithmetic MPC, rather than in the context of garbling. We also present a similar
PRF construction with Ω(n) bits of output, for which we can still obtain a near-quadratic
DRE size upper bound.4 Consequently, modulo the validity of the conjectured security, these
PRFs are nearly garbling-optimal.
Interpreted differently, our garbling-friendly PRF candidate establishes a barrier for super-
quadratic DRE lower bounds on explicit Boolean functions via natural proof techniques [53].
In contrast, we show that a recent candidate for a weak PRF with near-exponential security
due to Boneh et al. [19] has a linear DRE size.
Our results imply several qualitative separations, including near-quadratic separations
between computational and information-theoretic DRE size of Boolean functions, and between
the DRE size of weak vs. strong PRFs.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Cryptography
I Definition 1 (Pseudorandom Functions [35]). An (s(·), δ(·))-secure pseudorandom function
(PRF) family is an ensemble F = {Fλ}λ∈Z+ , where each Fλ is a keyed family of functions
Fλ = {fk : {0, 1}n(λ) → {0, 1}m(λ)}k∈{0,1}κ(λ) , satisfying the following security property:
Pseudorandomness. For every λ ∈ Z+ and every size-s (ensemble) of oracle circuits A (with
output in {0, 1}),∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ Ek←{0,1}κ(λ)U :{0,1}n(λ)→{0,1}m(λ)[A
fk(1λ)−AU (1λ)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ(λ).
n(·), m(·), and κ(·) are respectively called the input length, output length, and key length
of F .
I Definition 2 (Weak PRFs [34]). An (s(·), δ(·))-secure weak PRF family is a relaxation of a
PRF family as in Definition 1, with the “pseudorandomness” security property replaced by
the following notion of “weak pseudorandomness”:
Weak Pseudorandomness. For every λ, the tuples(
X1, . . . , Xs(λ), fK(X1), . . . , fK(Xs(λ))
)
3 This is almost immediate in the non-uniform setting, given our lower bounds. In the appendix we give a
constructive proof for this fact in the uniform setting by exhibiting a sublinear test for an average-case
variant of the natural property used in Nečiporuk’s method.
4 For this case, multi-bit output, we use input locality bounds of [9] to prove a slightly stronger (and
nearly tight) quadratic lower bound (contrast with our Ω(n2/ logn) bounds for single bit output).
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and(
X1, . . . , Xs(λ), Y1, . . . , Ys(λ)
)
are (s(λ), δ(λ))-indistinguishable in the probability space defined by sampling
K ← {0, 1}`(λ)
X1, . . . , Xs(λ) ← {0, 1}n(λ)
Y1, . . . , Ys(λ) ← {0, 1}m(λ).
I Definition 3. Random variables X and Y are (s, )-indistinguishable if the advantage of
every size-s circuit in distinguishing X from Y is at most . We denote this by X ≈(s,) Y .
2.2 Information Theory
I Definition 4. The min-entropy of a random variable X is H∞(X) def=
minx∈Supp(X) log2
(
1
Pr[X=x]
)
.
2.3 Decomposable Randomized Encodings
I Definition 5 (Randomized Encodings). A randomized encoding for a function f : {0, 1}n →
Y consists of a “randomness” distribution R, an encoding function Enc : {0, 1}n×R → {0, 1}`,
and a decoding function Dec : {0, 1}` → Y. ` is called the size of the randomized encoding.
A randomized encoding (R,Enc,Dec) for function f : {0, 1}n → Y should satisfy:
Correctness. For any input x ∈ {0, 1}n,
Pr
R←R
[Dec(Enc(x,R)) = f(x)] = 1.
Security. For all x, y ∈ {0, 1}n with f(x) = f(y), the distribution of Enc(x,R) is identical to
the distribution of Enc(y,R) when sampling R← R.
The security can be relaxed to require only that Enc(x,R) and Enc(y,R) cannot be effectively
distinguished by small circuits.
(s, δ)-Security. For all x, y ∈ {0, 1}n such that f(x) = f(y), for any circuit A : {0, 1}` →
{0, 1} of size at most s,∣∣ Pr
R←R
[A(Enc(x,R)) = 1]− Pr
R←R
[A(Enc(y,R)) = 1]∣∣ ≤ δ.
In this paper, we focus on decomposable randomized encoding (DRE), which is a randomized
encoding that also satisfies an additional property:
Decomposability. Each output bit of Enc(x, r) is determined by r and 1 bit of input x.
To ease presentation, we also introduce an equivalent definition of DRE. The equivalent
definition is used when we prove lower bounds on the size of DRE.
I Definition 6. An (s, δ)-secure decomposable randomized encoding (DRE) for a function
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is a family of random variables
X =
( X 10 , . . . ,Xn0
X 11 , . . . ,Xn1
)
such that
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Correctness. There is an algorithm Dec such that for every x ∈ {0, 1}n,
Pr[Dec(X 1x1 , . . . ,Xnxn) = f(x)] = 1.
Dec is called a decoding algorithm for X .
(s, δ)-Security. For all x, y ∈ {0, 1}n such that f(x) = f(y),
(X 1x1 , . . . ,Xnxn) ≈(s,δ) (X 1y1 , . . . ,Xnyn).
The size of X is
|X | def=
∑
i∈[n],b∈{0,1}
log2
∣∣ Supp(X ib )∣∣.
2.4 Function Restrictions
I Definition 7 ([50]). For any function f : Xn → Y , any set S ⊆ [n] with complement S¯,
and any z ∈ X S¯, the restriction of f to S using z is the function
fS|z : XS → Y
defined by fixing the coordinates in S¯ to the value z. More formally, for any x ∈ XS, we
define
fS|z(x)
def= f(x′),
where for each i ∈ [n],
x′i =
{
xi if i ∈ S
zi otherwise.
3 Lower Bounds on DRE Size
Over 50 years ago, Nečiporuk published a two-page note titled “On a boolean function.” [49]
Within these two pages, Nečiporuk introduced an elegant combinatorial measure of a function
related to the number of ways a function can be restricted distinctly. To this day, Nečiporuk’s
method still provides the strongest lower bounds known for formulas over arbitrary finite
bases, deterministic branching programs, non-deterministic branching programs, parity
branching programs, switching networks, span programs, and more [16].
In this section we recall Nečiporuk’s measure and add decomposable randomized encoding
(DRE) size to the list of complexity measures that are lower bounded by Nečiporuk’s measure.
Specifically, we show that for any function f , the DRE complexity of f is at least Nečiporuk’s
measure (which for explicit functions is as large as n2/ logn). Prior to this work no super
linear lower bounds on DRE size were known.
3.1 Technical Overview
To lower bound the DRE size of a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, we first consider all possible
restrictions of f , using notation as in Definition 7. For simplicity, suppose that
X =
( X 10 , . . . ,Xn0
X 11 , . . . ,Xn1
)
is a perfect DRE for f . Then for all S ⊆ [n] (with complement denoted by S¯), we observe
that:
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1. The distribution of (X izi)i∈S¯ does not depend on z ∈ {0, 1}S¯ (as long as fS|z is non-
constant). This follows from DRE security.
2. Given (X izi)i∈S¯ , the values (Xib)i∈S,b∈{0,1} are sufficient to reconstruct the truth table of
fS|z. This follows from DRE correctness.
Together, these properties imply that the size of the support of (Xib)i∈S,b∈{0,1} is at least
the number of non-constant truth tables of the form fS|z for some z ∈ {0, 1}S¯ . We obtain a
bound on the size of X by partitioning [n] into sets S1, . . . , Sm, and lower bounding the size
of each (X ib )i∈Sj ,b∈{0,1}. The maximum bound on the bit length of X that can be achieved
in this way is essentially Nečiporuk’s measure of f .
We elaborate further below, defining a somewhat more general computational analogue
of Nečiporuk’s measure (that will suffice for lower bounds on computationally secure DREs).
3.2 Nečiporuk’s Measure
Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be any boolean function. For any subset S ⊆ [n], let S¯ denote [n]\S,
and define
gS(f)
def= log(#{fS|z : z ∈ {0, 1}S¯}).
Let V = (V1, . . . , Vm) denote a partition of [n]. That is, V1, . . . , Vm are pairwise disjoint
subsets of [n] whose union is [n]. Then, the Nečiporuk measure of f is
G(f) def= max
V
∑
Vi∈V
gVi(f).
I Remark 8. It is well known that for any function f , G(f) ≤ n2/ logn [57].
3.3 Functions with Maximal Measure
We recall several functions whose Nečiporuk measures are known to be as high as possible
(Ω(n2/ logn), where n is the bit-length of the input).
Element Distinctness
Element Distinctness is a function EDm : [m2]m → {0, 1} which given a vector (x1, . . . , xm) ∈
[m2]m and outputs 1 if all xi are distinct and 0 otherwise (∃i 6= j such that xi = xj).
Others
Clique, matching, and determinant all have measure Ω(n2/ logn) [57].
Random
Finally, and perhaps unsurprisingly, we note that a random function has measure at least
n(n−2)
logn ) with overwhelming probability (for n large enough). See Appendix B for proof.
3.4 DRE Size Lower Bounds via Nečiporuk
We define a pseudo-min-entropic analogue of Nečiporuk’s measure, with an additional
non-constantness restriction that is tailored for use in DRE lower bounds.
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I Definition 9. The (s, )-pseudo min-entropy of a random variable X, which we will denote
by H˜(s,)∞ (X), is the supremum of H∞(X˜) over all random variables X˜ that are (s, )-
indistinguishable from X.
I Definition 10. For any function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} and any subset ∅ 6= V ⊆ [n], define
G˜
(s,)
V (f)
def= sup
(
H˜(s,)∞ (fV |Z)
)
,
where the supremum is taken over all {0, 1}V¯ -valued random variables Z whose support only
consists of values z that make fV |z non-constant.
We define G˜(s,)(f) to be the maximum over all partitions [n] = V1 ∪ · · · ∪ Vm of∑
i∈[m] G˜
(s,)
Vi
(f).
I Remark 11. If not for the non-constantness constraint on fV |Z , the measure G˜(∞,0) is the
same as Nečiporuk’s original measure. Reducing s or increasing  only increases this measure.
Taking the non-constantness restriction into account, our measure cannot be smaller than
Nečiporuk’s measure by more than O(n) (so superlinear lower bounds on Nečiporuk’s measure
imply an asymptotically identical lower bound on our measure).
Beyond a certain threshold, increasing s no longer changes the value of G˜(s,):
B Claim 12. For any function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} and any subset V ⊆ [n], we have
G˜
(∞,)
V (f) = G˜
(
22
|V |
,
)
V (f).
Proof. Any function of n bits can be computed by a circuit of size 2n. In fact this can
be strengthened to O( 2nn ) [59, 45], but we prefer the simpler bound 2n. Apply this to the
(s, )-indistinguishability in the definition of pseudo-min-entropy of fV |Z (which is a truth
table of bit length n = 2|V |). C
Our main lower bound is given by the following theorem.
I Theorem 13. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a function, and let X be a (s∗DRE, 13 )-secure DRE
for f with a decoding algorithm of size sDec.
Then for all V ⊆ [n], we have
|X V | ≥ min
(
log2
(
s∗DRE
sDec · 2|V |
)
, G˜
(s∗DRE, 13 )
V (f)− 2
)
.
Proof. Suppose otherwise – that |X V | < log2
(
s∗DRE
sDec·2|V |
)
and |X V | < G˜(s
∗
DRE,
1
3 )
V (f)− 2.
Let Z be a {0, 1}V¯ -valued random variable that maximizes H˜(s
∗
DRE,
1
3 )∞ (fV |Z), supported
by values z for which fV |z is non-constant, and let F˜V denote a random variable that is
(s∗DRE, 13 )-indistinguishable from fV |Z and satisfies H∞(F˜V ) = H˜
(s∗DRE, 13 )∞ (fV |Z). Let Z ′ be an
independent copy of Z.
We first claim that (X V¯Z , fV |Z) ≈(s
∗
DRE,
1
3 ) (X V¯Z′ , fV |Z). To see why, suppose for contradiction
that there is size-s∗DRE circuitA that distinguishes (X V¯Z , fV |Z) from (X V¯Z′ , fV |Z) with advantage
better than 13 . Then in particular there exist z, z′ ∈ {0, 1}V¯ such that A distinguishes
(X V¯z , fV |z) from (X V¯z′ , fV |z) with the same advantage. Hardwiring fV |z into A, this gives a
circuit B of size5 |B| ≤ |A| for distinguishing X V¯z from X V¯z′ with the same advantage. But
this contradicts the (s∗DRE, 13 )-indistinguishability that is guaranteed by DRE security.
5 Recall that the size of a circuit is measured in number of gates, and all gates of A whose inputs are the
hard-wired value fV |z can be simplified or eliminated.
M. Ball, J. Holmgren, Y. Ishai, T. Liu, and T. Malkin 86:9
We also know that (X V¯Z′ , fV |Z) ≈(s
∗
DRE,
1
3 ) (X V¯Z′ , F˜V ), so together with the previous claim, we
have (X V¯Z , fV |Z) ≈(s
∗
DRE,
2
3 ) (X V¯Z′ , F˜V ). However, there is a distinguisher that contradicts this.
Specifically, try all possible values of
(X ib)i∈V,b∈{0,1} (there are at most s∗DREsDec·2|V | possibilities),
and apply the DRE decoding algorithm (2|V | times per possibility) to see whether any
possibility “explains” the given truth table.
By correctness of the DRE, there will always exist a value that explains fV |Z given X V¯Z ,
but because H∞(F˜V ) > log2 |X V |+ 2, the probability that any value explains F˜V is at most
1
4 . Hence the distinguisher succeeds with probability
3
4 >
2
3 , which is a contradiction. J
3.5 The Nečiporuk Measure of PRFs
In this section, we prove lower bounds on the Nečiporuk measure of PRFs (of varying security
levels), which imply corresponding lower bounds on the size of DREs.
I Proposition 14. If E : {0, 1}κ+n → {0, 1} is an (s, )-secure PRF with key length κ and
input length n satisfying s ≥ 4 and  ≤ 16 , then for any subset V ⊆ [κ+ 1, κ+n] with |V | ≥ 2,
we have G˜(s,
′)
V (E) = 2|V | for ′ = 3+ 2−s+1 + 2−2
|V |+1.
Proof. Let Z ′ be a {0, 1}V¯ -valued random variable whose first κ coordinates are independent
and uniformly random, and the rest of whose coordinates are 0. By PRF security, the
probability that EV |Z′ is constant is at most δ
def= +2−min(s,2|V |)+1 ≤ +2−s+1 +2−2|V |+1 ≤
1
2 .
Let A be an arbitrary size-s circuit. Suppose for contradiction that A distinguishes EV |Z′
from a uniformly random truth table with advantage greater than . Then each input wire
of A can be replaced by an oracle gate to yield a circuit that distinguishes oracle access to
E(K, ·) (for uniform K) from oracle access to a uniformly random function with the same
advantage . This contradicts (s, )-security of the PRF. So EV |Z′ is (s, )-indistinguishable
from a uniformly random truth table.
Conditioned on EV |Z′ being non-constant, the advantage of any A in distinguishing EV |Z′
from a uniformly random truth table can increase to at most
1
2 + 
1− δ −
1
2 ≤ (
1
2 + ) · (1 + 2δ)−
1
2 = + δ + 2 · δ ≤ 3+ 2
−s+1 + 2−2
|V |+1.
Thus if Z denotes the random variable Z ′ conditioned on EV |Z′ being non-constant, we
have H˜(s,′)(EV |Z) = 2|V | for ′ = 3+ 2−s+1 + 2−2
|V |+1. J
I Corollary 15. If E : {0, 1}κ+n → {0, 1} is the evaluation algorithm for an (s, )-secure PRF
family with key length κ and input length n satisfying s ≥ 4 and  ≤ 16 , then G˜(∞,
′)(E) ≥
Ω
(
n log s
log log s
)
for ′ = 3 + 2−s+2. In particular, if the PRF family is exponentially secure,
then G˜(∞,′)(E) ≥ Ω
(
n2
logn
)
.
Proof. For every V ⊆ [κ + 1, n] of size |V | = log log s, Proposition 14 implies that there
exists a random variable Z such that H˜(s,′)(EV |Z) = 2|V | = log s for ′ = 3+ 2−s+2. But
by Claim 12, H˜(s,′)(EV |Z) = H˜(∞,
′)(EV |Z).
The lower bound on G˜(∞,′)(E) follows by partitioning [κ+n] into V0∪V1∪· · ·∪Vn/ log log s,
where V0 = [κ] and each Vi has size |Vi| = log log s for 1 ≤ i ≤ n/ log log s. J
I Remark 16. We obtain a similar result to Corollary 15 in Appendix A that applies to
uniformly secure PRFs.
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I Corollary 17. If E is the evaluation algorithm for an exponentially secure PRF family
with input length n, then any statistically secure DRE for E has size at least Ω
(
n2
logn
)
.
3.6 A Truly Quadratic Lower Bound
We observe that for exponentially secure PRFs with n-bit output, even computationally
secure DREs require size Ω(n2).
I Theorem 18. Any computational DRE of an exponentially-secure PRF with n-bits of
output must have size Ω(n2).
To prove this theorem we will rely on the following result of Applebaum et al. [9].
I Theorem 19. Let S(k, x, r) be a one-time MAC with key k, message x, and randomness
r. Let `(n) denote the input locality of Sk(x, r) and let s(n) denote the length of a tag, where
n is the security parameter. (A function has input locality ` if no input bit affects more than
` output bits.) Then, there is an efficient attack on S(k, x, r) that succeeds with probability
1/
(
s(n)
`(n)
) · 2−`(n).
Proof. Recall that an exponentially secure PRF fk : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is also an exponentially
secure one-time MAC [42]. Moreover, a DRE of a MAC preserves unforgeability [9]. Because
1/
(
n
`(n)
) · 2−`(n) ≤ 2`(n), it follows Theorem 19 that any DRE of an exponentially-secure fk
must have input locality Ω(n). By decomposability, any such DRE must have size Ω(n2). J
4 Upper Bounds on DRE Size
In this section we present nearly matching upper bounds for some of the explicit functions
to which our lower bounds apply. We explicitly conjecture two variants of the “hidden shift
problem” are exponentially secure PRFs and show that they admit nearly quadratic size
(efficient, perfect) DREs. Finally, we show a recent weak PRF candidate due to Boneh et
al. [19], conjectured to be nearly exponentially-secure, admits a linear-size (efficient and
perfect) DRE
4.1 Almost Tight Quadratic Upper Bounds
Partial Decomposability
We introduce the notation of a partially decomposable randomized encoding, so that later we
can construction DRE by composing a randomized encoding and a partially decomposable
randomized encoding. A randomized encoding (Enc,Dec) for a function f : {0, 1}n×W → Y
is a partially decomposable randomized encoding (PDRE) if every bit of Enc(x,w, r) is
determined by w ∈ W, r ∈ R and only 1 bit of x ∈ {0, 1}n.
I Lemma 20 (Composition of randomized encodings). Let Enc : {0, 1}n ×W → {0, 1}` be
(the encoding function of) a randomized encoding (Enc,Dec) for function f : {0, 1}n → Y.
Let Enc′ : ({0, 1}n ×W)×R → {0, 1}`′ be the encoding function of a PDRE (Enc′,Dec′) for
function Enc. Then Enc′ : {0, 1}n × (W ×R)→ {0, 1}`′ is the encoding function of a DRE
for function f .
Proof. The corresponding decoding function is Dec′′(c) := Dec(Dec′(c)). It’s easy to verify
(Enc′,Dec′′) is a DRE, as each bit of Enc′(x, r, w) is determined by (r, w) and only 1 bit of x.
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A DRE for Element Distinctness
Choose an O(logn)-bit prime p with p >
(
n
2
)
. For all 1 ≤ i < i′ ≤ n, define indicator
δi,i′ ∈ {0, 1} that captures whether xi = xi′ ,
δi,i′ :=
{
1, if xi = xi′ ,
0, if xi 6= xi′ .
Sample a ← Zp \ {0} for the CRS. For all 1 ≤ i < i′ ≤ n, sample random ri,i′ ∈ Zp from
CRS such that
∑
1≤i<i′≤n ri,i′ = 0. Define rˆi,i′ ∈ Zp as rˆi,i′ := ri,i′ + a · δi,i′ .
Then a DRE for element distinctness is induced by composing the following two claims:
B Claim 21. (rˆi,i′)1≤i<i′≤n is a randomized encoding of the functionality output.
Proof. It’s obvious that (rˆi,i′)1≤i<i′≤n is a randomized encoding of a ·
∑
1≤i<i′≤n δi,i′ . The
later is a randomized encoding of the functionality output because: when (xi)1≤i≤n are all
distinct, a ·∑1≤i<i′≤n δi,i′ is zero; when there is a collision, a ·∑1≤i<i′≤n δi,i′ is uniformly
random in Zp \ {0}. C
B Claim 22. For all 1 ≤ i < i′ ≤ n, there exists a PDRE for rˆi,i′ of size O(log4 n).
Proof. For any v ∈ Zp, let v[k] denote the k-th bit of its binary representation. Then the
k-th bit of ri,i′ can be computed from
rˆi,i′ [k] =
{
ri,i′ [k], if δi,i′ = 0
(ri,i′ + a)[k], if δi,i′ = 1
= ri,i′ [k]⊕ (ri,i′ [k]⊕ (ri,i′ + a)[k]) ·
log p∨
j=1
(xi[j]⊕ xi′ [j]),
which, as a function of (xi, xi′), is a binary branching program of size O(logn). Thus there
is a PDRE for rˆi,i′ of size O(log3 n) [8]6. As rˆi,i′ has logn bits, there exists a PDRE for rˆi,i′
of size O(log4 n). C
4.2 A PRF Candidate With A Nearly Optimal DRE
Now we can present the almost-optimally-garble-able candidate PRF. Modulo a conjecture
on its hardness, this simple algebraic PRF candidate admits a (perfect) DRE of size at most
a logn factor from the minimum. Moreover, a simple generalization of this candidate yields
linear output length with the same DRE complexity. Thus, if this candidate is exponentially
secure, it is indeed optimally-garble-able.
In addition to applications in efficient MPC, this candidate can be conversely interpreted
through Razborov and Rudich’s natural proof framework as barrier to proving super quadratic
bounds on DRE size [53].
6 For a branching program of size s and has t input bits, there is a DRE for the branching program of
size s2t.
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An Exponentially-Secure PRF Candidate
Our starting point is an algebraic object that has received considerable attention in both
cryptography and mathematics: Legendre sequences. A Legendre sequence is a sequence of
the form:
(x+ 1)(p−1)/2, (x+ 2)(p−1)/2, (x+ 3)(p−1)/2, . . .
where all operations are over Zp for some prime p.
The pseudorandomness of sequences of quadratic characters have a long history in both
cryptography and mathematics [4, 20, 24, 26, 38, 46, 47, 52, 55]. These sequences have
been shown to behave as if random with respect to a variety of statistical tests designed for
randomness.
Recent work has considered the so-called “hidden shift problems” and their generalizations.
In the quadratic character variant of the hidden shift problem, algorithms are given oracle
access to a function φk : Zp → {−1, 0,+1} where φk(x) = (k + x)(p−1)/2 from some
k ∈ Zp. The task is then to recover k. Efficient quantum algorithms for this problem are
known [61, 62, 63, 56, 41]. However, the best classical algorithms to date are still just
subexponentional (under an assumption on the density of smooth integers) [20, 56, 43].
Indeed, Dam, Hallgren, and Ip [63] have explicitly conjectured that φk is a PRF with
respect to polytime classical algorithms. Grassi et al. [37] additionally proposed this function
specifically as an “MPC-friendly” PRF. Recently, cryptanalytic bounties have been announced
on this PRF [31].
With the known attacks in mind, we give a twist on the hidden shift problem restricting
evaluation to a short interval. So far as we know this confounds all existing techniques
(including quantum algorithms) and the best algorithm7 runs in 2(1+o(1))n-time [60].
We actually make two conjectures: (1) restricted hidden shift yields an exponentially-
secure PRF with one bit of output, (2) a natural generalization is an exponentially-secure
PRF with many bits of output. But first, we define the restricted hidden shift function.
For any m ∈ Z+, let p ≡ 1 (mod m) be a prime with p ≥ 22n, and let 〈ζm〉 denote the
group of mth roots of unity in Z×p . For k ∈ Zp define
Charp,m,nk : [0, 2n − 1]→ 〈ζm〉
Charp,m,nk : x 7→ (k + x)
p−1
m (mod p).
Note that Charp,2,nk (x) = 0 for k + x = p. In order to achieve single bit output (just two
possible output values) we restrict the key space in addition to the input space, so that this
equation cannot be satisfied.
I Conjecture 23. Let p = p(n) be any prime sequence satisfying p ≡ 1 (mod m), p > 2n+1.
Then,
{{
Charp,2,nk
}
k∈{1,...,2n}
}
n∈Z+
is, for some s(n) = 2Ω(n), an (s(·), s(·)−1)-secure PRF
family.
Next, we present a variant with long output by applying an input restriction to the
“hidden power problem” [21] or “hidden root problem” [64]. In this problem, the goal is to
recover k using query access to x 7→ (k + x)e for more general e|p − 1 (the shift problem
7 The algorithm is to simply guess k and test on enough x. However it is worth noting that even this is not
known to work, and requires making a conjecture on the distribution of Legendre sequences generated
by random k [60]. The best provable distinguisher that we know of runs in time 2(3/2+o(1))n-time by
simply exhaustively enumerate all sequences of length 2n/2 and comparing [60]
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discussed above is simply the specific case of e = p−12 ). Notably, [21] demonstrated (classical)
algorithms for this problem that make O(1) queries and recover k in time e1+ logO(1) p.
With this in mind, we make the following conjecture.
I Conjecture 24. Let p = p(n) be any prime sequence and m = m(n) be any positive integer
sequence satisfying p ≡ 1 (mod m), p ≥ 22n, and pm ≥ 2n. Then
{{
Charp,m,nk
}
k∈Zp
}
n∈Z+
is,
for some s(n) = 2Ω(n), an (s(·), s(·)−1)-secure PRF family.
An O(n2) DRE for the Candidate PRF
We now show that there is a DRE for Charn,m,p(·) (·) of size O(n2). Assuming the above
conjectures, it follows from Corollary 32 that this DRE has essentially optimal size, not just
for Charn,m,p(·) (·), but among DREs for any exponentially-secure PRF.
For clarity, we present a DRE for Charp,2,nk and note that the construction can easily be
extended to the multi-bit output case.
Our starting point is a simple perfect randomized encoding for quadratic residue8:
Enc : x 7→ x · r2, for uniformly sampled r ← Zp
Dec : y 7→ y(p−1)/2
Security follows from the fact that any quadratic residue is mapped to a uniformly random
quadratic residue, and any non-residue is mapped to a uniformly random non-residue. Note
that this randomized encoding has size O(n).
However, we would like a randomized encoding of the quadratic residuosity of x+ k and
moreover we would like it to be decomposable. This is easily remedied via bit decomposition
and the fact that the above encoding is linear with respect to the input.
Enc : xi 7→ xi · 2i−1 · r2 + si
ki 7→ ki · 2i−1 · r2 + ti
where r, s1, . . . , sn, t1, . . . , t2n+1 are drawn uniformly from Zp
such that s1 + · · ·+ sn + t1 + · · ·+ t2n+1 = 0.
Dec : y1, . . . , y3n+1 7→
(∑
yi
)(p−1)/2
Similarly, correctness and security follow from the fact that an encoding is simply 3n + 1
random elements, conditioned on the fact that their sum is a random element with the
quadratic residuosity of x. Note that because the encoding consists of 3n+ 1 elements, each
of bit length 2n+ 1, the size of this DRE is O(n2).
4.3 A WPRF Candidate With A Nearly Optimal DRE
In this section, we observe that a recent weak pseudorandom function candidate put forward
by Boneh et al. admits a DRE of quasi-linear size [19].
Boneh et al. [19] have put forward the following WPRF candidate related to both the
learning parity with noise problem (with “deterministic” noise) and learning with rounding
problem (over constant-size modulus). Given a key k ∈ {0, 1}n, they define
8 A similar randomization technique for quadratic characters was previously used in related contexts
in [30, 5, 1, 37].
ITCS 2020
86:14 On the Complexity of DRE, Or: How Friendly Can a Garbling-Friendly PRF Be?
Protocol Let S6 and f act on Z6 on the right in the natural way. Let σ ∈ S6 denote the
permutation that maps x to x+ 1. Let L = 0 ∈ Z6.
Randomness :
Sample r1, . . . , rn−1 ← S6.
Define (R1,0, R1,1) = (L · r1, L · σ · r1)
For 2 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, define (Ri,0, Ri,1) = (r−1i−1 · ri, r−1i−1 · σ · ri)
Define (Rn,0, Rn,1) = (r−1n−1 · f, r−1n−1 · σ · f)
Encoding For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Enci(zi, Ri) = Mi = Ri,zi
Decoding M1 · · ·Mn
Figure 1 A DRE for a function of a sum mod 6 [17].
LWR6k : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
LWR6k(x) =
{
0 if 〈x, k〉 ≡ 0, 1, or 2 (mod 6)
1 if 〈x, k〉 ≡ 3, 4, or 5 (mod 6).
This candidate was proposed with efficient secure function evaluation protocols in mind;
however, the protocol presented in [19] requires two phases of interaction: first it applies a
DRE-based subprotocol for computing shares of the mod-6 inner product, and then another
subprotocol for rounding. Here we show that LWR6 has a DRE of size O(n).9
Let b·e : Z6 → {0, 1} denote the function
bxc =
{
0 if x ∈ {0, 1, 2}
1 otherwise.
We obtain our DRE for LWR6k by composing two DREs ([8, 11]); the first is for a function
that maps (z1, . . . , zn) 7→
⌊∑
i zi (mod 6)
⌉
for z1, . . . , zn ∈ {0, 1}, and the second is for the
AND function mapping (ki, xi) ∈ {0, 1}2 to ki · xi.
The DRE for the first function is obtained as a special case of a result on symmetric
functions due to Beimel et al. [17, Theorem 7.2, Figure 9] that refines a group-based DRE
due to Kilian [44]:
I Imported Theorem 25 ([17]). For any function f : Z6 → {0, 1}, the scheme of Figure 1
is a size-O(n) DRE of the function h that maps (z1, . . . , zn) 7→ f
(∑
zi (mod 6)
)
.
The second function is constant-sized, and thus has a constant-sized DRE by Barrington’s
theorem [14] and Kilian’s rerandomization.
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A PRF Bounds in the Uniform Setting
In this appendix, we give improved lower bounds on the complexity of garbling pseudorandom
functions (PRFs). In particular, the attack presented here is uniform, as opposed to non-
uniform bounds in Corollary 15. Our results follow from applying the natural proof framework
of [53]. However, we achieve improved bounds by demonstrating the existence of a property
tester for a relaxation of Nečiporuk’s measure. By combining our results with those of
Section 3.4 we show any exponentially-secure PRF has DRE size Ω(n2/ logn).
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We then discuss a candidate PRF with a DRE construction of size almost matching the
lower bound.
A.1 PRFs are complex under (average-case) Nečiporuk
Intuitively, because a random function has high measure under Nečiporuk, so should a
pseudorandom function.10 In fact, Servedio and Tan have recently shown how to exactly
learn functions with low (O(n1.99)) measure under Nečiporuk in time 2n−nδ (via membership
and equivalence queries) [58]. We show that the much simpler task of simply distinguishing a
function with low measure can be done much more quickly (and without equivalence queries,
which do not fit into the usual PRF game).
We accomplish this via an average case variant of Nečiporuk. Recall that Nečiporuk
is ultimately statement about the number of functions that can be generated under some
restriction. Viewed differently, this can be framed as a statement about the maximum entropy
of the random variable defined by sampling a restricted function uniformly at random. Our
observation is that for the special case of distinguishing from a random function it suffices to
look at the Shannon entropy of the same variable. Consequently, instead of bounding the
support size we can focus on much easier task of bounding the entropy.
An “average-case” notion of Nečiporuk
We begin by introducing our average-case variant of Nečiporuk’s measure that relies on
Shannon entropy as opposed to maximum entropy.
For a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, and a set S ⊂ [n], let Zf,S denote the variable
distributed according to fS|z for uniformly drawn z ← {0, 1}S¯ . Define,
hS(f)
def= H(Zf,S).
Notice that Hmax(Zf,S) = gS(f), thus it follows that hS(f) ≤ gS(f).
Random functions are complex (under hS)
Next we observe that random functions have high complexity with respect to the average-case
variant of Nečiporuk we defined above.
I Proposition 26. For any set S ⊆ [n] and a uniformly random function F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1},
Pr[hS(F ) ≤ 2|S| − t] < exp(− 2t
2
|S¯|+ ln(2))
We can apply the same style of balls/bins argument used for Nečiporuk’s original measure
again here.
10 Statements of this form indeed were at the heart of Razoborov and Rudich’s natural proof framework
and its recent extensions [53, 22, 23, 51]. Unfortunately, because Nečiporuk’s measure seems to behave
poorly under known pseudorandom function generators, its not clear how to apply their framework here
to get strong bounds on pseudorandom generators with simple DREs.
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Proof. First, we bound E[H(ZF,S)] from below. We will omit S from the superscript in this
proof (ZF = ZF,S). Additionally, we will take ZFφ to denote PrF [ZF = φ]. Note that for
any φ, E[ZFφ ] = 1/#{φ : {0, 1}|S| → {0, 1}} = 2−2
|S| .11
EF [H(Z)] = EF
∑
φ
ZFφ log(1/ZFφ )

=
∑
φ
EF [ZFφ log(1/ZFφ )]
≥
∑
φ
EF [ZFφ ] log(1/EF [ZFφ ])
= 22
|S| · 1
22|S|
log(22
|S|
)
= 2|S|
Note that the third line follows from Jensen’s inequality.
Next, we show concentration around the mean in the standard way. Consider H(ZF ) as a
Doob martingale on the independent random variables FS|z for z ∈ {0, 1}S¯ . Clearly, if F and
F ′ only differ on single restriction of f to z, then |H(ZF )−H(ZF ′)| ≤ log(2|S¯|)+ln(2)2|S¯| . Moreover,
because F is random, these variables are independent. So, we can apply McDiarmid/Azuma’s
inequality to get, for any t > 0:
Pr
F
[E[H(ZF )]−H(ZF ) ≥ t] ≤ exp( 2t2|S¯|+ln(2) ). J
Plugging |S| = logn and t = n/2 into the above proposition we immediately get the
following corollary.
I Corollary 27. For any set S ⊆ [n] such that |S| = logn, if F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is a
uniformly random function, then
Pr[hS(F ) ≤ n/2] < exp(− n
2
2(n− logn+ ln(2)) ) < exp(−n/2).
A.2 Low Nečiporuk measure can be distinguished from random
Next, we use the above to show that any function with Nečiporuk measure that is slightly less
than maximal can be distinguished from a random function in time O(2n/10). It immediately
follows that none of the classes whose functions have bounded Nečiporuk measure can contain
exponentially-secure PRFs.
The following theorem is implicit in Batu et al. [15].
I Imported Theorem 28. There is an algorithm that given sample access to a distribution X
supported on [N ], promised to either have “high” entropy (at least N/2) or “low” entropy (at
most N/21), runs in time O˜(N1/100) and distinguishes which is the case with overwhelming
probability.
11 In more detail: Let M = #{0, 1}S¯ (number of balls) and N = #{0, 1}{0,1}S (number of bins).
Then, for k ∈ N we can see that Pr[ZFφ = k/M ] is the probability that exactly k out M balls
(or restrictions z ∈ {0, 1}S¯) hit the bin φ (which happens with probability 1/N). Thus, Pr[ZFφ =
k/M ] =
(
M
k
)
N−k(1− 1N )M−k. Because this is simply a rescaled binomial distribution it follows that
E[ZFφ ] = 1M · MN = 1N .
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I Remark 29. Batu et al. actually show how to multiplicatively approximate entropy within
a factor of (1 + 2)γ (γ > 1,  ∈ (0, 1/2]) given sample access in time O(N1/γ2/2 logn) with
constant failure probability when the distribution has entropy at least Ω(γ/η) for some small
constant η ([15, Theorem 2]).
To apply this to the low entropy case, it suffices to suffices to show min-entropy is greater
than the constant assumed above. For these parameters, empirical estimates are more than
efficient enough. In fact, [15, Lemma 2] says just that. Finally, correctness of these estimates
can be amplified by taking the median/majority after poly logn repetitions.
I Theorem 30. There is an algorithm running in time O˜(2n/100) that given oracle access
to either a random function F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} or any f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} such that
G(f) < n221 logn can distinguish between the two cases with overwhelming advantage.
Proof. Note that if G(f) < n221 logn , then in particular
∑
Vi
gVi(f) < n
2
21 logn for the partition
(V1, . . . , Vn/ logn) of [n] into consecutive logn-bit blocks. Moreover, there must be some Vi
such that hVi(f) ≤ gVi(f) < n/21.
In contrast, Corollary 27 implies that for a uniformly random F , it holds with overwhelm-
ing probability that for all i, hVi(F ) ≥ n/2.
Additionally, for any i, it is possible to efficiently sample Zf,Vi by simply drawing
z ← {0, 1}|V¯i| uniformly at random and evaluating fVi|z on all x ∈ {0, 1}Vi . Because
|Vi| = logn, this procedure takes time poly(n).
It follows that we can run the procedure from Imported Theorem 28 on all Vi in time
O˜(2n/100). If the procedure outputs “High” on all Vi, then output “F .” Otherwise, output
“f .” By Theorem 28 and the above observations, the procedure described will err with at
most negligible probability. J
I Remark 31. We note that for  > 0 the above distinguisher can be modified to test on
the partition V = (V1, . . . , Vm) where each Vi is a block of size  logn (m = nn ) and again
distinguish entropy that differs by constant factor in any block from n/2, taking time O(2n)
overall. By Proposition 26 a random function will have Nečiporuk measure hVi(f) ≥ n/2 for
all Vi with high probability. It follows that an O(2n
)-secure PRF must have DRE complexity
Ω(n1+/ logn).
PRFs have high complexity
From Theorem 30, it almost immediately follows that there can be no exponentially-secure
PRFs in any class to which Nečiporuk applies. This yields a host of lower bounds on PRF
complexity that, to our knowledge, were not known before now.
I Corollary 32. No exponentially-secure PRF has
Decomposable Randomized Encodings of size o(n2/ logn),
Binary formulas of size o(n2/ logn) over arbitrary basis,
Deterministic branching programs of size o(n2/ log2 n),
Switching networks of size o(n2/ log2 n),
Non-deterministic branching programs of size o(n3/2/ logn),
Parity branching programs of size o(n3/2/ logn),
Span programs of size o(n3/2/ logn),
Switching-and-rectifier networks of size o(n3/2/ logn).
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B Deferred Proofs
I Proposition 33. For any set S ⊆ [n] and a random function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1},
Prf [2gS(f) ≤ 2n−|S| − t] < exp(− 2t22n−|S| )
This follows from a standard balls & bins argument, reproduced here for completeness.
Proof. Recall that 2gV (f) = #{fS|z : z ∈ {0, 1}S¯}. If we let Yφ for φ : {0, 1}S → {0, 1} be
the indicator random variable such that
Yφ :=
{
1 if ∃z ∈ {0, 1}S¯ : fS|z = φ
0 otherwise
Then we can rewrite the above as,
2gS(f) =
∑
φ:{0,1}S→{0,1}
Yφ.
By linearity of expectation,
E[2gS(f)] = E[
∑
φ
Yφ] =
∑
φ
E[Yφ] = 22
|S| · 2
|S¯|
22|S|
= 2n−|S|.
Finally, we consider 2gS(f) as a doob martingale on the independent random variables
fS|z for z ∈ {0, 1}S¯ . Clearly, if f and f ′ only differ on single restriction of f to z, then
|gS(f)− gS(f ′)| ≤ 1. Moreover, because f is random, these variables are independent. So,
we can apply McDiarmid/Azuma’s inequality to get, for any t > 0:
Pr
f
[E[2gS(f)]− 2gS(f) ≥ t] ≤ exp( 2t22|S¯| ). J
In particular, if we take |S| = logn and t = 2n−logn−1, then Prf [gS(f) ≤ n− logn− 1] ≤
exp(−2n−logn−1). This yields the following corollary via a union bound.
I Corollary 34. For a random function f , Prf [G(f) ≤ n2/ logn− 2n] ≤ nlogn · exp(−2n−1).
